Kicking the can down the road: government interventions in the European banking sector
Viral Acharya,
Sascha Steffen,
Lea Steinruecke and
Maximilian Jager
No 15009, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We analyze the determinants and the long-run consequences of government interventions in the eurozone banking sector during the 2008/09 financial crisis. Using a novel and comprehensive dataset, we document that fiscally constrained governments “kicked the can down the road†by providing banks with guarantees instead of full-fledged recapitalizations. We adopt an econometric approach that addresses the endogeneity associated with governmental bailout decisions in identifying their consequences. We find that forbearance caused undercapitalized banks to shift their assets from loans to risky sovereign debt and engage in zombie lending, resulting in weaker credit supply, elevated risk in the banking sector, and, eventually, greater reliance on liquidity support from the European Central Bank.
Keywords: Forbearance; Evergreening; Zombie lending; Sovereign debt crisis; Bank recapitalization; Fiscal constraints; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 G21 G28 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-fdg and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15009 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: Kicking the Can Down the Road: Government Interventions in the European Banking Sector (2021) 
Working Paper: Kicking the Can Down the Road: Government Interventions in the European Banking Sector (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15009
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15009
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().