When the Threat is Stronger than the Execution: Trade and Welfare under Oligopoly

J. Peter Neary and Dermot Leahy

No 15112, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We compare trade liberalization under Cournot and Bertrand competition in reciprocal markets. In both cases, the critical level of trade costs below which the possibility of trade affects the domestic firm's behavior is the same; trade liberalization increases trade volume monotonically; and welfare is U-shaped under reasonable conditions. However, welfare is typically greater under Bertrand competition; for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition, implying a "van-der-Rohe Region" in parameter space; and, for even higher trade costs, there exists a "Nimzowitsch Region", where welfare is higher under Bertrand competition even though no trade takes place.

Keywords: Cournot and bertrand competition; Cross-hauling; Nimzowitsch region; Oligopoly and trade; Trade liberalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: When the threat is stronger than the execution: trade and welfare under oligopoly (2021)
Working Paper: When the Threat Is Stronger Than the Execution: Trade and Welfare under Oligopoly (2020)
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