Relative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage and Collusion
Matthew J. Bloomfield,
Catarina Marvao () and
No 15115, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative performance evaluation ("RPE") in CEO pay plans. We exploit illegal cartel membership as a source of variation in the potential for costly sabotage and document that firms are more likely to use RPE if they are currently cartel members. Moreover, firms frequently drop RPE from their CEOs' pay plans immediately after their cartels are detected. We further provide suggestive evidence that the potential for costly sabotage explains these patterns; cartel membership severs the empirical association between RPE and competitive aggression.
Keywords: cartels; Collusion; Compensation; Relative Performance Evaluation; Sabotage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-hrm
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