Exit vs. Voice
Luigi Zingales,
Eleonora Broccardo and
Oliver Hart
No 15176, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in promoting socially desirable outcomes in companies. We show that in a competitive world exit is less effective than voice in pushing firms to act in a socially responsible manner. Furthermore, we demonstrate that individual incentives to join an exit strategy are not necessarily aligned with social incentives, whereas they are when well-diversified investors are allowed to express their voice. We discuss what social and legal considerations might sometimes make exit preferable to voice.
Keywords: Exit; voice; Social responsibility; Divestment; Boycott; Engagement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D21 D23 D62 D64 H41 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15176 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Working Paper: Exit vs. Voice (2020) 
Working Paper: Exit vs. Voice (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15176
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15176
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().