Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Alessandra Casella and Macé, Antonin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonin Macé

No 15201, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling -- the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions -- to trade votes with oneself only -- such as storable votes or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.

Keywords: Logrolling; Voting; Vote markets; Storable votes; Quadratic voting; Bundling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? (2021)
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Working Paper: Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? (2021)
Working Paper: Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? (2020)
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