Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence

Konstantin Sonin, Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov

No 15295, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this essay, we provide a simple conceptual framework to elucidate the forces that lead to institutional persistence and change. Our framework is based on a dynamic game between different groups, who care both about current policies and institutions and future policies, which are themselves determined by current institutional choices, and clarifies the forces that lead to the most extreme form of institutional persistence ("institutional stasis") and the potential drivers of institutional change. We further study the strategic stability of institutions, which arises when institutions persist because of fear of subsequent, less beneficial changes that would follow initial reforms. More importantly, we emphasize that, despite the popularity of ideas based on institutional stasis in the economics and political science literatures, most institutions are in a constant state of flux, but their trajectory may still be shaped by past institutional choices, thus exhibiting "path-dependent change", so that initial conditions determine both the subsequent trajectories of institutions and how they respond to shocks. We conclude the essay by discussing how institutions can be designed to bolster stability, the relationship between social mobility and institutions, and the interplay between culture and institutions.

Keywords: Conflict; Constitutions; Democracy; Institutions; Institutional change; Persistence; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 D74 N10 N40 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his, nep-pke and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence (2020)
Working Paper: Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence (2020)
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