Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards

Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili and Oriol Tejada

No 15311, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. Our main insight is that to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative committee size must be small, no matter whether information acquisition costs are private or not. Our analysis and results cover two polar cases--information costs are either private or public--and unravel both the potential and the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.

Keywords: Voting; -; committee; -; cost; sharing; -; information; acquisition; -; reward; scheme; -; monetary; transfers; -; majority; rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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