Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources

Marek Pycia and M. Utku Ãœnver
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: M. Utku Ünver

No 15377, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In environments where heterogeneous indivisible resources are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we show that an allocation mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Re-interpreting Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in terms of auditability of the mechanism, we further show that these are precisely the mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and auditable.

JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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