EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Financial Policymaking after Crises: Public vs. Private Interest

Paul De Grauwe, Orkun Saka and Yuemei Ji ()

No 15413, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: What drives actual government policies after financial crises? In this paper, we fi rst present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using the most comprehensive dataset available on de-facto financial liberalization over seven policy domains across 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that fi nancial crises can lead to more government intervention and a process of re-regulation in financial markets. Consistent with a demand channel from public (interests) to policymakers, we fi nd that post-crisis interventions are common only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous political setting -i.e., term limits- muting policymakers' accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that promote their private interests. These privately-motivated interventions cannot be associated with immediate crisis response, operate via controversial policy domains and favour incumbent banks in countries with more revolving doors between political and financial institutions.

Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15413 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Financial Policymaking after Crises: Public vs. Private Interests (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Financial policymaking after crises: Public vs. private interests (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Financial policymaking after crises: public vs. private interests (2020) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15413

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15413

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-23
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15413