The Volunteer’s Dilemma in Finite Populations

Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

No 15536, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also groups of volunteering types. Homomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the groups have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such homomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the group becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large.

Keywords: Volunteering; Stochastic stability; Finite populations; Mixed strategies; Collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-ore
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