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Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match

Leeat Yariv, Federico Echenique, Ruy Gonzalez and Alistair Wilson

No 15559, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Most doctors in the NRMP match with one of their most-preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse, and casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value.

Keywords: Nrmp; Deferred acceptance; Interviews; First-rank matches (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match (2020) Downloads
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