Monetary Integration and Economic Convergence
Anne Sibert
No 1561, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Recent research in contract theory views ownership as a substitute for complete contracts. In this paper this approach is applied to monetary integration. Countries face a coordination problem when conducting monetary policy: negative spillovers ensure uncoordinated policy generates too high inflation. Ex ante, policy-makers can undertake politically costly economic reform. This has a positive spillover because it improves the outcome of the monetary policy game. Ex post, contracting over policy may be possible, however, it is supposed that ex-ante contracting over reform and monetary policy, is not. This paper analyses when monetary union is a good substitute for this inability to commit.
Keywords: Economic Integration; Montetary Union; Policy Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 F33 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1561 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary Integration and Economic Convergence (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1561
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1561
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().