Quality and selection in regulated professions

Gaetano Basso, Eleonora Brandimarti, Michele Pellizzari and Giovanni Pica

No 15674, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Entry into many occupations is regulated to screen out the least able candidates, but available evidence suggests that this objective is rarely achieved. Using microdata covering the universe of Italian law school graduates (2007-2013), we show that this result is largely due to the strong intergenerational transmission within regulated professions. We find that having relatives already active in the profession significantly increases the probability of passing the entry exam and boosts earnings, particularly for those who performed poorly in law school.

Keywords: Occupational regulation; Licensing; Intergenerational mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J44 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Quality and Selection in Regulated Professions (2021)
Working Paper: Quality and Selection in Regulated Professions (2021)
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