What Shapes the Quality and Behavior of Government Offcials? Institutional Variation in Selection and Retention Methods

Claire Lim and James Snyder

No 15675, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In representative democracies, a variety of rules are employed to select and retain public officials to reflect public preferences over policies. We discuss the literature on selection and retention rules for government officials, focusing on ``low-information'' offices. First, we overview the historical origin and the scope of the variation in selection and retention rules. Second, we provide conceptual frameworks for assessing the advantages and disadvantages of direct elections and discuss various factors that influence the functioning of elections. Third, we present empirical regularities. We summarize the baseline effects of the institutional variation and their interaction with factors such as media and compensation. Finally, we discuss outstanding questions in theoretical and empirical fronts, and how the digitization of government information and advances in machine learning can open up new avenues for research.

Keywords: Appointment; Election; Partisan; Nonpartisan; Voter information; Accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H7 K4 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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