Collective Memories on the 2010 European Debt Crisis *

Kai Konrad, Laura Arnemann and Niklas Potrafke

No 15683, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine whether collective memories on the aid&reform programs chosen to handle the 2010 European debt crisis differ between citizens from borrower and lender countries. We use new international survey data for non-experts and experts in member countries of the euro area. The results show that non-experts from borrower and lender countries remember aspects of the programs in different manners; indicating biases for assessments of how the crisis outcomes are perceived in borrower and lender countries. Nation-serving biases may well explain if the European debt crisis has reduced the sense of belonging rather than bringing European citizens closer together.

Keywords: Collective memories; European debt crisis; Nation-serving biases; Aid&reform programmes; Experts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F36 F55 H12 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Collective memories on the 2010 European debt crisis (2021)
Working Paper: Collective Memories on the 2010 European Debt Crisis (2021)
Working Paper: Collective memories on the 2010 European debt crisis (2021)
Working Paper: Collective Memories on the 2010 European Debt Crisis (2021)
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