Skill versus Voice in Local Development

Katherine Casey, Rachel Glennerster, Edward Miguel and Maarten Voors

No 15694, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Where the state is weak, traditional authorities control the local provision of public goods. These leaders come from an older, less educated generation and often rule in an authoritarian and exclusionary fashion. This means the skills of community members may not be leveraged in policy making. We experimentally evaluate two solutions to this problem in Sierra Leone: one encourages delegation to higher skill individuals and a second fosters broader inclusion in decision-making. In a real-world infrastructure grants competition, a public nudge to delegate lead to better outcomes than the default of chiefly control, whereas attempts to boost participation were largely ineffective.

Keywords: Governance; Human capital; Delegation; Traditional authority; Foreign aid; Community driven development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 I25 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Skill Versus Voice in Local Development (2023)
Working Paper: Skill versus Voice in Local Development (2019)
Working Paper: Skill Versus Voice in Local Development (2018)
Working Paper: Skill versus Voice in Local Development (2018)
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