Speculative and Precautionary Demand for Liquidity in Competitive Banking Markets
Diemo Dietrich and
No 15827, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We demonstrate that the co-existence of different motives for liquidity preferences profoundly affects the efficiency of financial intermediation. Liquidity preferences arise because consumers wish to take precautions against sudden and unforeseen expenditure needs, and because investors want to speculate on future investment opportunities. Without further frictions, the co-existence of these motives enables banks to gain efficiencies from combining liquidity insurance and credit intermediation. With standard financial frictions, banks cannot reap such economies of scope. Indeed, the co-existence of a precautionary and a speculative motive can cause efficiency losses which would not occur if there were only a single motive. Specifically, if the arrival of profitable future investment opportunities is sufficiently likely, such co-existence implies inefficient separation, pooling, or even non-existence of pure strategy equilibria. This suggests that policy implications derived solely from a single motive for liquidity demand can be futile.
Keywords: competitive bank business models; expenditure needs; Investment opportunities; liquidity insurance; Penalty rates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D86 E21 E22 G21 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-ias and nep-mac
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