Local Global Watchdogs: Trade, Sourcing and the Internationalization of Social Activism
Thierry Verdier,
Pamina Koenig,
Sebastian Krautheim and
Löhnert, Claudius
No 15878, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
International NGO campaigns criticizing firms for infringements along their internationalized value chains are a salient feature of economic globalization. We argue that understanding the international patterns of NGO campaigns requires accounting for the geography of their targets’ economic activities. We propose a model of global sourcing and international trade in which heterogeneous NGOs campaign against heterogeneous firms in response to infringements along their international value chains. We find that campaigns are determined by a triadic gravity equation where all three bilateral trade costs matter for NGO campaigns. Importantly, the sourcing trade costs between the supplier and the firm, which do not involve the country of the NGO, shape the patterns of NGO campaigns through their effect on the sourcing decision of firms. We use recently available data on NGO campaigns to estimate our triadic gravity equation and find strong support for this prediction.
Keywords: International trade; International sourcing; Gravity; Ngos; Campaigns; Social activism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F60 F63 L31 O35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15878 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Working Paper: Local Global Watchdogs: Trade, Sourcing and the Internationalization of Social Activism (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15878
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP15878
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().