Contracting in Peer Networks

Ron Kaniel and Peter DeMarzo

No 16177, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider multi-agent multi-firm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to their peers’, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals a “rat race†emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first-best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.

Date: 2021-05
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Journal Article: Contracting in Peer Networks (2023)
Working Paper: Contracting in Peer Networks (2021)
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