Algorithmic collusion, genuine and spurious

Giacomo Calzolari (), Emilio Calvano, Vincenzo Denicolo and Sergio Pastorello

No 16393, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We clarify the difference between the asynchronous pricing algorithms analyzed by Asker, Fershtman and Pakes (2021) and those considered in the previous literature. The difference lies in the way the algorithms explore: randomly or mechanically. We reaffirm that with random exploration, asynchronous pricing algorithms learn genuinely collusive strategies.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence; Reinforcement learning; Collusion; Exploration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D83 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
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