Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments

Aner Sela

No 16503, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study elimination tournaments with n stages and 2n symmetric players. The players have heterogeneous effort budgets that decrease within the stages proportionally to the efforts allocated in the previous stages such that for each effort unit that a player allocates, he loses α (the fatigue parameter) units of effort from his budget. We show that if the fatigue parameter α is larger than (1/n), the players equally allocate their efforts over all the first n-1 stages, and only in the final stage, they exert a lower effort.

Keywords: Elimination tournaments; Knockout tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09
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Journal Article: Effort allocations in elimination tournaments (2022)
Working Paper: Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments (2021)
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