Organizing Data Analytics

Ricardo Alonso and Câmara, Odilon
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Odilon Câmara

No 16768, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main trade-offs in organizing data generation, analysis and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, while the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and implementation.

Keywords: Strategic experimentation; Bayesian persuasion; Tampering; Organizational design; Information technology; Audit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D83 M10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12
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Journal Article: Organizing Data Analytics (2024)
Working Paper: Organizing data analytics (2024)
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