Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk

Ludovic Renou, Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci ()

No 16801, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the wel- fare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker’s ability to cross-verify the experts’ advice acts as a commit- ment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert’s equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.

Date: 2021-12
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Working Paper: Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk (2021)
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