The Politics of the Paycheck Protection Program

Thomas Lambert and Prachi Mishra
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Deniz Igan

No 16842, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper examines the incidence of special interests in the allocation of loans through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). We find that lobbying at the firm and industry levels helps obtain larger PPP loans during the pandemic. We also observe that PPP lending is more responsive to lobbying in ideologically less conservative areas as well as in industries less affected by the pandemic. Our findings are consistent with the notion that lobbying firms have experience in navigating administrative and policy complexity and can thus benefit more from aid provided under the PPP.

Keywords: Covid-19; Ideology; Lobbying; Paycheck protection program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G21 G28 G32 G38 H12 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Politics of the Paycheck Protection Program (2025)
Working Paper: The Politics of the Paycheck Protection Program (2024)
Working Paper: The Politics of the Paycheck Protection Program (2024)
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