Conditional Control: The Consequences of Expanding Creditors’ Right to Initiate Bankruptcy

Yishay Yafeh, Assaf Hamdani, Yevgeny Mugerman, Ruth Rooz and Nadav Steinberg

No 16844, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the effects of a court decision granting creditors the power to force into bankruptcy corporate debtors whose liabilities exceed their assets even if they are current on their payments. We find that bond (stock) prices responded positively (negatively) to the court ruling and that firms affected by it did not reduce their risk, but increased their net worth through equity injections and aggressive accounting. As a result, the informativeness of these firms’ financial reports decreased. We conclude that the benefits from some measures of creditor empowerment may be mitigated by borrowers’ incentives to present overly-optimistic financial reports.

Keywords: Bankruptcy; Creditor rights; Financial distress; Informativeness; Aggressive accounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G33 K22 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP16844 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16844

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP16844

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().