Non-bossiness and First-Price Auctions

Marek Pycia and Madhav Raghavan

No 16874, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We show that the first-price auction with no reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and efficient in equilibrium. The first-price auction with optimal reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational, and revenue maximizing.

Date: 2022-01
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