Hostile Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Governance

Tim Jenkinson and Alexander Ljungqvist ()

No 1695, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously been suggested. It provides a complete breakdown of ownership and takeover defence patterns in German listed companies and finds highly fragmented (but not dispersed) ownership in non-majority controlled firms. We document how the accumulation of hostile stakes can be used to gain control of target companies given these ownership patterns. The paper also suggests an important role for banks in helping predators accumulate, and avoid the disclosure of, large stakes.

Keywords: Banks; Block Trades; Corporate Governance; Germany; Takeovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1695 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1695

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1695

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().