Organized Information Transmission

Laurent Mathevet and Ina Taneva ()

No 16959, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We formalize the concepts of horizontal and vertical information transmission and introduce two families of information structures, namely single-meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that specialize along these dimensions. We characterize the strategic outcomes that they implement in general finite incomplete information games and illustrate the resulting linear programming approach in a linear network example. We build on the characterizations to show that these families are unconstraine-doptimal in binary-action games with strategic complementarities. Finally, we generalize these families to multiple meetings and random hierarchies and characterize the corresponding strategic outcomes.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Delegated transmission; Bayes correlated equilibrium; Information design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
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Working Paper: Organized Information Transmission (2020)
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