What Drives U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior?

Edoardo Teso

No 16966, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Do U.S. corporate elites contribute to political campaigns purely motivated by ideological considerations – as typically assumed by the literature on individual donors’ drivers of contributions – or are their donations also a tool of political influence? I investigate this question using a new panel on the contributions to members of U.S. Congress (MCs) by 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over the 1999-2018 period. I show that donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader’s company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. The estimates suggest that (i) 13% of the observed gap in corporate leaders’ donations to policy relevant versus other MCs is driven by an influence-seeking motive, and (ii) the total corporate leaders’ donations that are driven by the influence-seeking motive are about 53% of the overall donations by their companies’ PACs to all MCs over the same period.

Keywords: Campaign finance; Lobbying; U.s. congress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
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