Minority Underrepresentation in U.S. Cities

Federico Ricca and Francesco Trebbi

No 17009, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper investigates the patterns of Minority representation and voter registration in U.S. municipal governments. For the period 1981-2020, we report substantial levels of strategic underrepresentation of African American, Asian, and Latino voters in U.S. local politics. Disproportionality in the representation and in voter registration rates of Minority groups are widespread, but stronger when racial or ethnic minorities are electorally pivotal. Underrepresentation is determined by the combination of several endogenous institutional features, starting from systematic disparity in voter registration, strategic selection of electoral rules, city’s form of government, council size, and pay of elected members of the council. We provide causal evidence of the strategic use of local political institutions in reducing electoral representation of minorities based on the U.S. Supreme Court narrow decision of Shelby County v. Holder (2013), which deemed unconstitutional Voting Rights Act (VRA) Section 4(b), removing federal preclearance requirements for a specific subset of U.S. jurisdictions.

Keywords: Us cities; Minority representation; Ethnic politics; Voting rights act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
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Working Paper: Minority Underrepresentation in U.S. Cities (2022)
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