Occupational Regulation, Institutions, and Migrants’ Labor Market Outcomes
Maria Koumenta,
Mario Pagliero and
Davud Rostam-Afschar
No 17027, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study how licensing, certification and unionisation affect the wages of natives and migrants and their representation among licensed, certified, and unionized workers. We provide evidence of a dual role of labor market institutions, which both screen workers based on unobservable characteristics and also provide them with wage setting power. Labor market institutions confer significant wage premia to native workers (4, 1.6, and 2.7 log points for licensing, certification, and unionization respectively), due to screening and wage setting power. Wage premia are significantly larger for licensed and certified migrants (10.3 and 6.6 log points), reflecting a more intense screening of migrant than native workers. The representation of migrants among licensed (but not certified or unionized) workers is 15% lower than that of natives. This again implies a more intense screening of migrants by licensing institutions than by certification and unionization.
Keywords: Occupational regulation; Licensing; Certification; Unionization; Migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J16 J31 J44 J61 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05
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