Wages and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporatist Setting: The Netherlands
Edwin Leuven () and
C. N. Teulings ()
No 1706, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
In a corporatist country like the Netherlands, wages should not be distinguished by union membership status, but by bargaining regime. Acknowledging only the firms’ bargaining regime, we find small differences between four regimes and certainly no distinction between ‘covered’ and ‘uncovered’ firms. Distinguishing – within covered firms – between workers covered and uncovered by collective bargaining, including a model with partially unobserved sector selection, we find somewhat larger bargaining regime effects, and sometimes substantial coverage effects. Estimation of the latter, is seriously troubled by unobserved heterogeneity, however.
Keywords: Bargaining Regime; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Wages and the bargaining regime in a corporatist setting: the Netherlands (2002)
Working Paper: Wages and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporist Setting: The Netherlands (2000)
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