The Labour Market and Corporate Structure

Daron Acemoglu and Andrew Newman

No 1708, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of labour demand and labour market regulations on the corporate structure of fims. It finds that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labour market regulations, unions or higher labour demand. These comparative static results are in line with the broad trends in the data. The paper also finds that the organization of firms has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, monitoring is a type of ‘rent-seeking’ activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring. Labour market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce employment.

Keywords: Corporate Structure; Efficiency Wages; Labour Market Regulation; Monitoring; Moral Hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: The labor market and corporate structure (2002)
Working Paper: The Labor Market and Corporate Structure (1997)
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