Preferences for Reforms: Endowments vs. Beliefs

Romain Duval, Yi Ji, Chris Papageorgiou (cpapageorgiou@imf.org), Ippei Shibata and Antonio Spilimbergo

No 17088, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Are preferences for reforms driven by individuals’ own endowments or beliefs? To address this question, we conducted a cross-country survey on people’s opinions on employment protection legislation—an area where reform has proven to be difficult and personal interests are at stake. We find that individuals’ beliefs matter more than their own endowments and personal pay-offs. A randomized information treatment confirms that beliefs explain views about reform, but beliefs can change with new information. Our results are robust to several robustness tests, including to alternative estimation techniques and samples.

Keywords: Political opinions; Preferences; Political economy; Regulation; Employment protection; beliefs; Ideology; Surveys (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 J08 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP17088 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Preferences for Reforms: Endowments vs. Beliefs (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17088

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP17088
orders@cepr.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (repec@cepr.org).