Assortative Mating and Wealth Inequality

Andreas Fagereng, Luigi Guiso and Luigi Pistaferri

No 17148, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We use population data on capital income and wealth holdings for Norway to measure asset positions and wealth returns before individuals marry and after the household is formed. These data allow us to establish a number of novel facts. First, individuals sort on personal wealth rather than parents’ wealth. Assortative mating on own wealth dominates, and in fact renders assortative mating on parental wealth statistically insignificant. Second, people match also on their personal returns to wealth and assortative mating on returns is as strong as that on wealth. Third, post-marriage returns on family wealth are largely explained by the return of the spouse with the highest pre-marriage return. This suggests that family wealth is largely managed by the spouse with the highest potential to grow it. This is particularly true for households at the top of the wealth distribution at marriage. We use a simple analytical example to illustrate how assortative mating on wealth and returns and wealth management task allocation between spouses affect wealth inequality.

Keywords: Wealth inequality; Returns to wealth; Assortative mating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E13 E21 E24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03
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Working Paper: Assortative Mating and Wealth Inequality (2022)
Working Paper: Assortative Mating and Wealth Inequality (2022)
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