On the Political Economy of Autocratic Land Reform

Rob Davies, Halvor Mehlum, Karl Ove Moene and Ragnar Torvik

No 17201, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We explore how autocratic land reforms can be used to prevent democratic change. The autocrat confiscates and redistributes land in an attempt to secure his power, exploiting the endogenous social identities and loyalty in the population. His optimal land reform balances the benefits of giving land to members of the elite to strengthen their support with the benefits of giving land to tillers to reduce their opposition against the autocratic rule. We show how autocratic land redistribution is more likely to increase land inequality further, the more unequal the land distribution is in the first place. While land to tillers is allocated in a way that increases inequality among them, land to the elite is allocated in a way that reduces the inequality within the elite.

Keywords: Land reform; Autocracy; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P48 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP17201 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17201

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP17201

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().