Disengaging from Reality Online Behavior and Unpleasant Political News

Leonardo D'Amico and Guido Tabellini

No 17210, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Why, in the face of scandals and misbehaviors, do partisan supporters hardly change their minds about their favored candidates? We study individuals’ online engagement with negative news on candidates in the 2016 US Presidential Election. Compared to independents, partisan users avoid commenting bad news on their favorite candidate, but seek them on its opponent, a political “ostrich effect†. When they do comment on bad news about their candidate, they try to rationalize them, display a more negative sentiment, and are more likely to cite scandals of the opponent. This behavior is consistent with the predictions of a model of online interactions where paying attention to non-consonant news is emotionally or psychologically costly, while paying attention to consonant ones is pleasing. Because users enjoy receiving positive feedback on their views, intrinsic biases that drive ideological segregation are amplified on social media.

Date: 2022-04
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Working Paper: Disengaging from Reality: Online Behavior and Unpleasant Political News (2023)
Working Paper: Disengaging from Reality - Online Behavior and Unpleasant Political News (2022)
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