Creating a Safe Asset without Debt Mutualization: the Opportunity of a European Debt Agency

Massimo Amato, Everardo Belloni, Carlo Favero and Lucio Gobbi

No 17217, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper analyses the potential of a European Debt Agency (EDA) as an efficient debt management institution for the Euro area. The simulation of prices and quantities that would have been observed in a scenario with an operational EDA illustrates that there have been fluctuations in bond prices that EDA would have been able to prevent. Moreover, due to the less volatile price dynamics, EDA would have been capable to absorb the entire eurozone debt while reducing its size. This evidence speaks in favour of EDA as an institutional debt management tool for hedging Member States financing from market sentiment vagaries; creating a European Safe Asset; unburdening ECB from debt management and managing efficiently the implementation of fiscal rules.

Keywords: European debt agency; European safe assets; Debt management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H12 H63 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
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