Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

Hyun Song Shin

No 1722, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a welfare comparison of the two procedures by constructing a game-theoretic model of decision making by an arbitrator in the face of self-interested reporting strategies by the interested parties. Even if it is assumed that the arbitrator is, on average, as well informed as the two opposing parties, the adversarial procedure is strictly superior. The source of this superiority lies in a non-convexity in the adversarial procedure. There are increasing marginal returns to improvements in the information of an interested party. There are no analogous increasing returns to the arbitrator’s information under the inquisitorial procedure.

Keywords: advocates; Asymmetric Information; inquisitor; legal procedure; persuasion games; value of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D74 D82 K23 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration (1998)
Working Paper: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration (1996)
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