Monetary Regimes and Labour Market Reform

Anne Sibert and Alan Sutherland ()

No 1731, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Policy-makers’ incentives to undertake costly reform depends on the international monetary system. We consider the effect of monetary regimes on labour market reform. We find international negotiation of monetary policy produces less reform than non-cooperation. Reform is lowest of all with monetary union. Because integration lowers reform, inflation is higher under monetary union than with national currencies. It may be higher or lower with negotiation than no coordination. Despite the negative impact on reform, negotiation produces higher welfare than no coordination. Monetary union can produce higher or lower welfare than either negotiation or no coordination.

Keywords: Economic Reform; Monetary Union; Policy Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 F33 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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