Cyber Risk and Security Investment

Toni Ahnert, Michael Brolley, David Cimon and Ryan Riordan

No 17403, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a model in which firms invest in cybersecurity to protect themselves and their clients from cyber attacks. Since cyber security investment is unobservable, firms may signal their investment to attract clients. In equilibrium, firms under-invest in cyber security. We derive testable implications for the modality of cyber attacks, the probability of a successful attack, and client fees. To raise efficiency, a regulator can impose a minimum level of security investment or legislate consumer protection that shifts the burden of cyber attacks from clients to firms. Both regulations induce firms to invest the constrained-efficient amount in cyber security.

Keywords: Cyber risk; Cyber security; ransomware; cyber security ratings; Regulation; Consumer protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06
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