The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As

Antoine Dubus and Patrick Legros

No 17404, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Firms may share information to discover potential synergies between their data sets and algorithms, which eventually may lead to more efficient mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. However, as pointed out by Arrow, information sharing also modiï¬ es the competitive balance when companies do not merge, and a ï¬ rm may be reluctant to share information with potential rivals. Under general conditions, we show that ï¬ rms beneï¬ t from (partially) sharing information. Because more sharing of information may increase industry expected proï¬ ts both when there is head-to-head competition and when there is an M&A, the presence of a regulator who can prevent or allow the M&A can decrease or increase the level of information sharing, as well as consumer surplus, with respect to the no-regulator case. A regulator who can also control the level of information sharing will allow ï¬ rms to share information.

Keywords: Synergies; Mergers; Sale of data; Incomplete information; Antitrust; Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L1 L21 L24 L41 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Sale of Data: Learning Synergies Before M&As (2024)
Working Paper: The Sale of Data:Learning Synergies Before M&As (2022)
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