Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?

Alan Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Jakob de Haan and David-Jan Jansen

No 17441, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to guide inflation expectations; another is to ensure accountability and create trust. This article surveys a rapidly-growing literature on central bank communication with the public. We first discuss why and how such communication is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach does in fact affect inflation expectations and trust. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way.

Keywords: Communication; Central bank; General public; Monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D84 E52 E58 G53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope? (2024)
Working Paper: Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope? (2022)
Working Paper: Central Bank communication with the general public: promise or false hope? (2022)
Working Paper: Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope? (2022)
Working Paper: Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope? (2022)
Working Paper: Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope? (2022)
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