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Family bargaining and the gender gap in informal care

Helmuth Cremer and Chiara Canta

No 17539, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the optimal long-term care policy when informal care can be provided by children in exchange for monetary transfers by their elderly parents. We consider a bargaining model with single-child families. Daughters have a lower labor market wage and a lower bargaining power within the family with respect to sons. Consequently, they provide more informal care and have lower welfare in the laissez-faire (although not necessarily lower transfers). The first best involves redistribution from families with sons to families with daughters and can be implemented by a gender-specific schedule of public LTC benefits and transfers to working children. If the policy is restricted to be gender neutral, we find that the informal care provided by daughters should be distorted up to enhance redistribution from families with sons to families with daughters. Transfers within the family should be distorted in both types of families.

Keywords: Long-term care; Informal care; Strategic bequests; Family bargaining; gender-neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H23 H31 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-09
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Working Paper: Family Bargaining and the Gender Gap in Informal Care (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Family Bargaining and the Gender Gap in Informal Care (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Family bargaining and the gender gap in informal care (2022) Downloads
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