Time Trumps Quantity in the Market for Lemons

William Fuchs, Piero Gottardi and Humberto Moreira ()

No 17615, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a dynamic adverse selection model where privately informed sellers of divisible assets choose when and how much to sell to competing buyers. With commitment, delay and lower quantities signal higher quality. Only the discounted quantity traded is pinned down in equilibrium. With spot contracts and observable past trades, there is a unique, fully separating path of trades in equilibrium. Regardless of the trade horizon or trade frequency, the same welfare is attained as in the commitment case. With continuous trading, delay alone signals higher quality. With privately observable trades the equilibrium coincides only when trading takes place continuously.

JEL-codes: D53 D82 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
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