Fiscal Norming of Wages to Promote Employment with Monopoly Unions
Alain de Crombrugghe and
Grégory de Walque ()
No 1766, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
The paper analyses how a firm-level tax (or subsidy) calculated on the average wage relative to a pre-set norm may promote employment. We assume a monopoly union setting wages at the firm level to maximize that part of the wage bill exceeding the reservation wage. The fiscal device affects union perception of labour demand and induces it to quote a lower wage and obtain a higher corresponding level of employment. Empirical tests are performed over a sample of 43 Polish firms in 1990 and 1991. They support our model assumptions as well as the ‘employment-enhancing’ effect of the tax in Polish firms.
Keywords: fiscal incentives; monopoly unions; Poland; wage norm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 H22 J30 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1766
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1766
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().