The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing
Dirk Bergemann,
Tibor Heumann and
Stephen Morris
No 17897, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distributions of willingness to pay of the buyers. With a constant elasticity cost function, constant markup pricing provides the optimal revenue guarantee across all possible distributions of willingness to pay and the lower bound is attained under a Pareto distribution. We characterize how profits and consumer surplus vary with the distribution of values and show that Pareto distributions are extremal. We also provide a revenue guarantee for general cost functions. We establish equivalent results for optimal procurement policies that support maximal surplus guarantees for the buyer given all possible cost distributions of the sellers.
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
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Working Paper: The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing (2023) 
Working Paper: The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing (2023) 
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