The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem

David Levine, Andrea Mattozzi and Salvatore Modica

No 17936, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We formally study two bidder first price, second price, and all-pay auctions with known values, deriving the equilibrium payoffs and strategies and showing when all three yield the same equilibrium payoffs to the bidders. This latter result, the tripartite auction theorem, does not hold for all auctions, in particular it can fail for symmetric auctions with high stakes and in auctions with very low stakes.

Keywords: First price auctions; All-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
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Journal Article: The tripartite auction folk theorem (2024)
Working Paper: The Tripartite Auction Folk Theorem (2023)
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