Fortune's Formula or the Road to Ruin? The Generalized Kelly Criterion With Multiple Outcomes
Karl Whelan ()
No 18060, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
You can bet on an event where there are multiple possible winners but only one will actually win. At the odds offered, you think there may be multiple bets worth taking. How much do you place on each bet to maximize your expected utility? We describe how this problem can be solved for concave utility functions and illustrate the properties of the solution. The optimal betting strategy is more aggressive than strategies derived from considering each outcome separately such as the Kelly criterion. The strategy also recommends sometimes placing bets with negative expected returns because they act as hedges against losses on other bets. While this strategy maximizes the bettor's subjective expected utility, if betting odds incorporate a profit margin and reflect underlying probabilities correctly, then this more aggressive approach loses more money and results in lower realized utility.
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18060 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Working Paper: Fortune's Formula or the Road to Ruin? The Generalized Kelly Criterion With Multiple Outcomes (2023) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18060
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP18060
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().