Feudal Political Economy

Desiree Desierto and Mark Koyama

No 18085, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The political economy of medieval Europe was shaped by alliances between lords and vassals, forged through peaceful and violent means. We model coalition formation through bargaining or by conquest, and where members can rebel against their coalition. We derive conditions under which a realm unites under one rule — the grand coalition, or remains fragmented into several coalitions. We motivate our analysis with key historical episodes, from the Frankish Kingdom in the 5th to 10th centuries and England in the 11th to 15th centuries.

Keywords: Bargaining; Coalitions; Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D74 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-04
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